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Epilogue: The Protestant Future 
Predicting the future is a fools’ game which everyone plays. Of course we will not get it 
right, but the themes and patterns we have seen play out over five centuries of Protestant 
history suggest some guesses as to what might happen next. Two caveats before we begin. 
First: none of these guesses will be entirely correct, and some of them will be entirely wrong. 
Second: this is not a description of what I want to happen, but of what I think will happen 
whether I like it or not. 
Old quarrels and new 
Protestantism’s formal and informal divisions are not about to heal. Protestants will not run 
out of things to argue about, and while some arguments will simmer down, others will 
become bitterer. Formal denominational structures will continue to weaken. There will be 
more independent, self-governing congregations, and where denominations hold together 
they will do so by becoming loose confederations. The reality of a democratic age is that 
churches are answerable to the footloose believers who fund them. Churches that try to deny 
this fact are swimming against the tide. 
Proliferating divisions will be a source of continued grief to many Protestants. There 
may be good theological reasons to regret division, but it will not damage Protestantism’s 
prospects. From the nineteenth-century United States to modern Africa, Protestantism has 
thrived most when it is most divided, with sects and preachers vying for converts. Stagnation 
or decline is much more likely when a single church dominates, as in much of Protestant 
Europe, or where several churches are brought together into formal or informal unions in 
which they avoid competing with one another, as in America’s ‘mainline’ or the pre-1949 
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Church of Christ in China. Division only becomes dangerous if rivalry turns into active 
hostility, in which a particular denomination sees battling with its rivals as its principal 
calling. 
 Unlike for most of Protestantism’s history, there will not be much effort to impose 
orthodoxies by force. Dominant denominations or movements will not be able to call on the 
power of the state to support them against their rivals, and few of them will want to try. This 
will extend to disputes over ethics and doctrine. Historically, many Protestants have wanted 
to make their own views normative for entire societies, whether through civil penalties for 
blasphemy or bans on alcohol or Sunday trading. Protestant political activism will certainly 
continue, but not in this form. Few Protestants will have the stomach for imposing their own 
moral disciplines onto entire societies, often even preferring to use those disciplines to 
differentiate themselves. Where they do campaign for coercive legislation, they will do so on 
secular grounds. This withdrawal from coercion will only make intra-Protestant arguments 
more intractable. 
 The main driver of continued division will be Protestantism’s knack for adaptation. 
Protestantism will continue to fit itself promiscuously to cultures and subcultures across the 
globe. Nobody will like all of the results, many of which will simply entrench divisions 
which are already wearyingly familiar. But Protestantism’s arguments never stay in the same 
spot for long. It is possible to make a guess at where they will go next. 
 In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, a knot of issues around gender 
and sexual ethics have been bitterly divisive. This has been because many of Protestantism’s 
host societies have changed their norms on these issues with astonishing speed. Protestants 
have had to scramble to keep up with these changes, which has been all the harder because 
they have not been spread evenly across the world. The resulting, highly charged debates 
have created the impression that contemporary Protestantism is irrevocably divided between 
563 
 
repressive, patriarchal dinosaurs and wild, freewheeling libertines. In fact, the gaps between 
the various sides are less striking than the speed with which the whole debate’s centre of 
gravity has moved. 
 Since the eighteenth century, most Protestant churches, especially the most energetic 
of them, have been predominantly female. Women have sometimes outnumbered men by 
three to two or more. Until the past half-century, however, it was unusual for leaders to be 
drawn from the majority gender. That pattern has now largely collapsed. It is true that many 
Protestant churches continue, formally and informally, to restrict the central role in leading 
public worship to men. Given Protestants’ characteristic mulish stubbornness when 
challenged, those restrictions will not change fast, and may for a time become points of 
defiant, counter-cultural pride. Despite that, Protestantism’s institutional patriarchy is being 
hollowed out. At every other level of Protestant churches, the numbers and energy of the 
female majority will make itself felt. Female leadership in everything apart from formal 
public worship has been the norm for Pentecostalism from the beginning, and will 
increasingly become the norm for Protestantism as a whole. Some Protestants, men and 
women, will continue to worry that their religion is being feminised. This is a legitimate 
worry for a religion which aspires to convert men as well as women, but it also reflects sexist 
assumptions about men’s primary importance. There is no reason to suspect that being 
female-dominated will harm Protestantism. It may, indeed, be an excellent adaptation to a 
changing world. 
 On sexual ethics, the gaps are also less dramatic than they appear, because 
Protestantism finds it difficult to defy a settled social consensus. So, for example, some 
Protestants have joined the Roman Catholic Church in opposing artificial contraception. To 
take such a stand, howver, is to incite your congregation to ignore you, or to defect to the 
church across the street. A powerful moral and theological argument was once made against 
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contraception. Nevertheless, the cause is lost in most of the world. Most Protestants have 
given up fighting it.  
A similar transition is well under way on the one sexual issue which we might 
imagine would be non-negotiable for Christians. The New Testament does not record Jesus 
having much to say about sexual ethics, but he adamantly opposed divorce, and especially 
remarriage after divorce. Protestants have questioned that standard from the beginning, often 
allowing, for example, for separation and even actual divorce in cases of domestic violence or 
even simple adultery. In many contemporary societies, even this watered-down version of the 
traditional standard has become almost impossible to apply. Most modern Protestants find 
themselves holding a middle position: disapproving of or merely lamenting divorce in the 
abstract; accepting it as a social reality and, often, the lesser of two evils in particular cases; 
accepting the reality of remarriage, sometimes joyfully, sometimes grudgingly, but without 
demands that couples separate or that children be treated as illegitimate. For good or ill, much 
of the world now lives in an age of serial monogamy. Protestantism has had to get used to the 
fact. 
Having swallowed that camel, it will not strain at some further gnats, although it may 
take a little time to digest them. One long-standing issue which has not gone away is 
polygamy. Christians have since ancient times insisted on exclusive monogamy as the only 
legitimate form of marriage, and have developed theological and ethical arguments for this, 
but the purely Biblical basis for it is pretty shaky. A couple of New Testament verses require 
Christian ministers to be monogamous, and the rest of the New Testament seems to assume 
that monogamy is normal, but the Old Testament is full of divinely approved polygamists. As 
we have seen, the question has periodically resurfaced through Protestantism’s history. 
Luther burned his fingers on the issue. John Milton wrote a treatise defending polygamy, but 
thought better of publishing it. Mormonism became notorious for institutionalising polygamy. 
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The main reason polygamy has rarely been practised by Protestants is simply that it has not 
been common in many of Protestantism’s host societies. However, in much of Africa and 
some other regions of the world polygamy is a well-established social reality, and the rise of 
Protestantism in these regions has made the question unavoidable.  
It was a missionaries’ dilemma for decades. In 1888, the Anglican Communion’s 
international assembly, the Lambeth Conference, hewed as best it could to a traditionalist 
line: polygamists cannot be baptised unless they renounce all but one of their wives. This 
amounted to a demand that women be cast off and their children disowned, although it was 
accepted that wives themselves might be baptised while remaining in their plural marriages. 
The predictable result was that polygamous converts withdrew to form churches of their own, 
such as the United Methodist Church in Nigeria. Twentieth-century Anglicans struggled to 
reconcile their monogamous principles with the social realities missionaries were 
confronting. The official line progressively softened. The 1988 Lambeth Conference finally 
accepted that polygamists may be baptised, but forbade them from contracting further plural 
marriages after baptism.1 Even this line will prove hard to defend. Protestant converts who do 
not wish to abandon polygamous social norms will find churches to endorse this, just as 
converts in societies where divorce and remarriage are common expect churches to work with 
that reality. South Africa’s Nazaretha Church admits polygamists to high office and has 
publicly defended President Jacob Zuma’s polygamy.2 Some churches will resist this 
pressure. Some will succumb reluctantly to it. Others will proudly embrace it. All of them 
will disagree fiercely about the subject. Converts will choose what suits them best. 
At present the single most explosive divide is over homosexuality. Again, the speed 
of change in the western democracies has been astonishing. Many countries have moved from 
                                                 
1 Timothy Willem Jones, ‘The Missionaries’ Position: Polygamy and Divorce in the Anglican Communion, 
1888-1988’ in Journal of Religious History 35/3 (2011), 393-408. 
2 Joel Cabrita, Text and Authority in the South African Nazaretha Church (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), 121, 342. 
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criminalisation to full legal equality within half a century, with a parallel shift in cultural 
norms from ignorance and loathing to an almost banal acceptance. Churches have struggled 
to find their voice. The majority have tried to maintain their traditional condemnations, some 
enthusiastically, some simply wishing that these distasteful people would go away. A 
minority have embraced gay rights and developed theologies to fit. The course of this 
ongoing dispute will be determined by wider social change. Most Protestants in societies 
which accept gay rights will eventually – over a generation or two – find ways of coming to 
terms with that reality, some cheerfully, many gracelessly. Some will continue to hold out, 
making a virtue of being counter-cultural, hoping to suffer legal penalties which they can 
interpret as persecution. They will also be bolstered by links with societies around the world 
where gay rights have as yet gained little ground, or have faced a backlash. But the reality is 
that both sides of this argument are driven by society, not theology. As long as some societies 
accept gay rights while others find them anathema, Protestants too will be divided, in roughly 
the same proportions and indeed for roughly the same reasons. 
This litany of social conformity may seem a little disheartening. Are Protestants 
doomed simply to tag along behind social shifts, finding justifications for them after the fact? 
Very often, yes. We have seen plenty of occasions when Protestants have embraced the 
beliefs their host societies needed, whether it be the God-given status of slavery in the 
American South or the divine summons to battle on all sides of World War I. But 
Protestantism is more than a vessel waiting to be filled. There are some social norms it 
revolts at. In contemporary disputes over sexual ethics, the issue of abortion stands out. 
Abortion is now socially normalised in many parts of the world, but few even of the most 
liberal or pro-feminist Protestants have been able to bring themselves to accept the practice. 
If they support legalising abortion, it tends to be on the grounds of minimising harm. The 
breadth of the anti-abortion consensus is particularly striking since it has such weak Biblical 
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foundations. It is a moral intuition, not a textual deduction. It seems unlikely either that that 
intuition will falter, or that the broader move towards legal abortion around the world will 
slow. 
It is a reminder that Protestants can discover and pursue ethical principles apart from 
the rest of society. Sometimes they do so believing that they have history on their side, but 
the self-conscious Protestant attempt to get prophetically out in front of history has a mixed 
track record. Slave-trade abolitionism, or the anti-apartheid cause, have been vindicated by 
time. Alcohol prohibition, or the prophetic attempt to create ‘religionless Christianity’: not so 
much. To say nothing of some German Protestants’ readiness to hitch themselves to Nazism’s 
bandwagon. Protestants will no doubt keep on trying to embrace the future. Some of them 
will no doubt make promises of a ‘Second Reformation’, a phrase which has surfaced 
repeatedly through Protestant history and, like most sequels, is a reliable marker of a lack of 
any real ideas or energy. 
The main feature of Protestant views of the future, however, will continue to be 
apocalypticism. One might imagine that predictions of Christ’s imminent return would, by 
now, be salted with a recognition that it might not happen just yet – indeed, that Christianity’s 
history may still only be getting started. But Protestants have a poor track record of thinking 
that way, and there is no reason to think that will change. Individuals’ instinct that the place 
they stand is actually a crux of world history is too strong. The secular world’s all-too-
plausible apocalyptic anxieties, from climate change and nuclear weapons to the impact of 
artificial intelligence, will only lend credence to this pattern of Protestant thought. It will lead 
some Protestants to withdraw in despair from society, others to engage urgently with it, and a 
few to try to precisely predict or, worse, to precipitate the coming end. 
That is a perennial theme, but what new causes will animate and divide the next 
generation of Protestants? My guess is that some Protestants will rediscover the spiritual 
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importance of food. Protestantism is highly unusual amongst world religions in making no 
dietary prescriptions of any kind, although many churches still frown on alcohol, and the 
Seventh-day Adventists go further. There are almost too many reasons for more Protestants to 
be drawn to dietary self-regulation. Fasting and self-denial are both perennial spiritual 
disciplines and potent marks of identity. In consumer societies they have a counter-cultural 
cachet, and where Protestants are competing with other religious groups they are ways to 
assert recognisable piety. Since Protestants do not like managing their piety with calendars, 
self-denial is less likely to mean cycles of temporary fasts than indefinite regimes of self-
discipline: in particular, full or partial vegetarianism, a practice whose modern history is 
entwined with Protestantism’s.3 This may be justified on health grounds, as a way of 
honouring the bodies God gave us. It may be justified with reference to the Old Testament’s 
dietary laws, for which some Protestants have always hankered. It may be justified on the 
grounds of the environmental damage or the use of scarce food resources that are associated 
with animal husbandry. It may be justified on animal-centred grounds, whether the specific 
cruelties of industrialised farming or the wider intuition that killing and consuming fellow-
creatures is wrong. It will also be opposed: on classic grounds of Christian freedom, and, of 
course, because many people like eating meat.  
Beneath these disputes and many others will be the Bible. Throughout this book we 
have seen that Protestants use the Bible both devotionally and polemically, as lovers and as 
fighters. Twentieth-century disputes between conservative and modernist theologies have 
rarely recognised this basic fact. Those two parties disagree bitterly about how and indeed 
whether to use the Bible polemically, but in practice, their use of it devotionally and as a 
source of inspiration is shared ground. This dispute will not be resolved, but it will move on. 
                                                 
3 I. Miller, ‘Evangelicalism and the Early Vegetarian Movement in Britain c.1847-1860’ in Journal of Religious 
History 35 (2011), 199-210; Samantha Calvert, ‘A Taste of Eden: Modern Christianity and Vegetarianism’ in 
Journal of Ecclesiastical History 58 (2007), 461-481. Full disclosure: in 2012 I became pescatarian myself for 
some of the reasons discussed here. 
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Twentieth-century textual conservatism, like seventeenth-century Protestant Orthodoxy, was 
a defensive stance – and a successful one, as the collapse of various liberal and radical 
Protestantisms during the same period shows. But it has also involved formidable problems, 
especially where a no-surrender textual absolutism has painted Protestants into scientific or 
historical claims that look very implausible, or into ethical stances which are painfully 
counter-cultural. In the coming decades, that hard defensive line will be softened. 
The fundamental reason for this is the rise of Pentecostalism, global Protestantism’s 
main engine. Pentecostals will continue joyfully to affirm belief in the Bible as a touchstone 
of faith. However, their openness to the Holy Spirit’s continued promptings gives them a 
means of sidestepping textual stumbling-blocks while still affirming faith in the Word. Their 
tradition makes it easier to read the Bible as a love-letter and less necessary to read it as a 
treatise. The great Pentecostal ecumenist David du Plessis was as loyal to the Bible as anyone 
could wish, but in a 1986 memoir reflected that ‘as Jesus predicted, I can write a Book of the 
Acts of the Holy Spirit in my lifetime that would eclipse the Acts of the Apostles’.4 The Bible 
is the Word of God, but not the last word.  
 For one example of what is possible, consider the Friday Masowe Church in 
contemporary Zimbabwe, whose members proudly style themselves ‘the Christians who 
don’t read the Bible’. As one of their preachers explained in 1999: 
Here we don’t talk of Bibles. What is the Bible to me? Having it is just trouble. Look, 
why would you read it? It gets old. Look again. After keeping it for some time it falls 
apart, the pages come out. ... We don’t talk Bible-talk here. We have a true Bible here 
– and he indicated his heart. In fact, it is clear that the Masowe church’s leaders do know 
their Bibles, and even learned their disdain for the Bible from the Bible. Rather, they believe 
                                                 
4 Joshua R. Ziefle, David du Plessis and the Assemblies of God: The Struggle for the Soul of a Movement 
(Leiden: Brill, 2013), 105. 
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that ‘the Bible is the Word of God, but it is not always relevant to the needs of Africans 
today’. So they look to the Holy Spirit for direct guidance.5 This is an extreme example, more 
like Quakerism than normal Pentecostalism, but once you have accepted the possibility that 
the Holy Spirit can act and speak here and now, this is where it can lead. It is not old-
fashioned textual fundamentalism. It is not old-fashioned liberalism either.  
The ever-more exuberant variety of Protestantism will itself weaken textual 
fundamentalism. It is not simply that a cacophany of different interpretations undermines any 
simple notion of being a ‘Bible-believer’. The Bible itself is becoming increasingly varied: a 
slow-burning but important development. Most Protestant cultures formed around a single 
Biblical translation. These texts – the Luther Bible in German, the King James Bible in 
English, the Union Version in Chinese – came to be venerated, and sometimes treated as 
inspired texts in their own right, as was also the case with some ancient translations. This 
made shared Protestant vernacular cultures in those languages possible, and gave believers 
the immediate contact with the Word which they craved. But it had its drawbacks.  
One, ironically, is the sheer quality of those iconic Bibles. The King James Bible is a 
literary masterpiece, and I have of course used it for the epigraphs throughout this book. But 
it rendered the whole of the Bible, a Babel of literary styles and voices, into the same 
sombrely magnificent register, so making it easier to mistake ‘the Bible’ for a single voice. It 
also masked a feature of the Bible which was immediately apparent to its ancient readers. The 
Greek of the New Testament is not sombrely magnificent, but blunt, simple marketplace 
language. Many ancient readers found the claim that this was God’s Word shocking, or 
laughable. Christians typically replied that it was indeed shocking: as shocking as God 
choosing to become a human baby. That salutary shock is something which few Protestants 
have ever been able to feel. The explosion of new Biblical translations, permanently breaking 
                                                 
5 Matthew Engelke, A Problem of Presence: Beyond Scripture in an African Church (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2007), 2-3, 6-7. 
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the monopolies of those old, iconic versions, has helped to break down Protestantism’s 
unified cultures, for good or ill. It makes it harder for Protestants to know, collectively, what 
the Bible says. It may also make it easier for them to hear, individually, what the Bible is 
saying. 
 
Protestants in the world 
Protestant growth in China and sub-Sarahan Africa will continue for the time being, although 
the blistering pace may slow. This will not, however, produce a new rash of ‘Protestant 
countries’, like Germany or Britain of old. In some countries, as seems to be the case in South 
Korea, Protestants will strike a ceiling beyond which it is hard to expand further. More 
complete dominance is possible in Africa, where there may be more self-proclaimed 
‘Christian countries’ like Zambia. But there as elsewhere, the speed of Protestantism’s spread 
raises the possibility that it may ebb as quickly as it has flowed. It has become proverbial 
amongst African Christians that African Christianity is a mile wide and an inch deep. It is not 
at all clear that African Christians deserve such disparaging comments, but certainly the new 
Christian identities of first- and second-generation converts are not yet settled and stable. 
Settled stability may not be something which our age has to offer. 
 Pentecostalism’s growth in Latin America is also set to continue, a success with wider 
significance. This is the first instance in modern times of Protestants converting Catholic 
populations wholesale, or indeed of any of the world’s major religions winning large numbers 
of converts from another. It raises the question: what else might Pentecostalism achieve? The 
country to watch is India. Despite enormous effort over several centuries, India’s Christian 
population remains in the region of 2-3%. However, if India achieves the sustained economic 
growth and urbanisation to which it aspires, the resulting social dislocation could create the 
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kinds of conditions in which Pentecostalism has thrived a great elsewhere in the world. It is 
possible that over the coming decades Pentecostalism may make significant inroads, 
especially if borne by Latin American or even African missionaries. And while Hindu 
identity is a formidable obstacle, alienation from Hindu nationalism may also provide an 
opening. 
 South Asia is also a likely site of conflict with one of Protestantism’s two great global 
competitors: Islam. The two great global religious movements of the past half-century, 
Pentecostalism and jihadist Islam, are strange twins. Where Pentecostalism has spread almost 
unnoticed, jihadist Islam has made itself spectacularly visible. How these two movements’ 
very different trajectories will intersect is one of the key questions of the twenty-first century. 
I hesitate to make any predictions at all, since the answer will depend less on developments 
within Protestantism than on how the bitter, switchback conflicts within the Islamic world 
play out. Some factions will triumph, some will be suppressed, some will discredit 
themselves, but although the rest of the world has a considerable stake in these struggles, it 
will not have very much influence on them.  
Protestantism’s competition with Islam will be focused on frontier zones, above all 
the southern Sahara and central Africa. This is likely to be a bruising and defensive battle, a 
struggle involving a good deal of actual violence, and also a race for the moral high ground. 
Here, if anywhere, Protestants will feel the need to hold to textual precision and to austerely 
traditionalist views of gender and sexual ethics. This struggle will not, however, see many 
conversions in either direction. Its outcome – which may well be a grim stalemate – will be 
determined by violence, as Muslim and Christian rivals try to drive each other out of 
particular territories; and by demographics, as it becomes clear which group is outbreeding 
the other. It is not a cheerful prospect. 
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Protestantism will also confront Islam in Europe, but here the decisive factor is the 
presence of its other great global competitor. Not the historic enemy, Catholicism, whose 
rivalry with Protestantism continues but has become friendlier and less existentially 
threatening; but secularism. Secularism has made all the running in Europe in the past half-
century, and which has also proved formidable in North America. Europe and America’s 
white Christians have not quite accepted yet that their old cultural dominance is gone, even 
though many of them now disown that dominance and its historical baggage. Nor have 
European and American secularists quite accepted yet that they will not sweep all before 
them. What has complicated this long-running drama is jihadist Islam. Islamist rhetoric labels 
the western democracies as ‘Christian’ or indeed as ‘Crusaders’, and some right-wing 
elements in both Europe and America have embraced this notion of a clash of cultures 
between Christian and Muslim. For others, especially in Europe, the sensible desire to avoid 
any notion of a war against Islam has meant confronting jihadism through a wider scepticism 
about religion of any kind in public life. How Europe’s historic religions will negotiate this 
minefield remains to be seen, but the terrain is not easy. 
If European Protestantism has a future, it will likely be newly built, rather than a 
matter of reviving historical denominational establishments.6 There are two reasons to 
suspect this may happen. One is immigration: Europe’s combination of wealth, proximity to 
poor and conflict-prone regions, and sharp demographic down-turn mean that, one way or 
another, its flow of immigrants is unlikely to slow. In particular, African Christianity’s 
presence in Europe will only increase. 
European and American politics may contribute, too. The western democracies have 
been undergoing a slow crisis of legitimacy, in which growing minorities of voters have 
become disenchanted with their political systems and with the centrist technocracies they 
                                                 
6 Such as my own, the Church of England. As I said, this is not about what I want to happen. 
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tend to produce. This often manifests as anger with ‘politicians’ as a class, and as a 
conclusion that politics is inherently corrupt. It can either bolster unconventional politicians 
who promise to change the entire political culture, or it can foster disgusted withdrawal from 
political life. These are alarming conditions, but they are similar to those in which 
Pentecostalism has thrived elsewhere in the world. Communities which affirm disdain for the 
corruption of public life, and which offer spiritual rather than political power, may find that 
their message resonates. It is even possible that, on the model of anti-corruption political 
parties across the world, a new Pentecostal politics may emerge in parts of Europe, 
committed less to a particular policy agenda than to changing the political culture with a new 
moralism. Such commitments are much easier to make than to keep, and can mask grave 
dangers. It is not at all clear that a development like this would be good for the western 
democracies, nor even that it would bolster Protestantism, except in the short term. It does, 
however, seem likely that the western democracies’ moribund and transactional political 
culture will find a new moral compass at some point. In which case, there are many worse 
options available. 
As Protestants and Protestantism continue to play their parts in these and other dramas 
over the decades ahead, it will be important to remember what Protestantism is. It is an 
identity, indeed a whole family of squabbling identities, which people define themselves by, 
hold to, fight for, and sometimes abandon. It is also a family of cultures and practices, which 
set the patterns of individuals’ and communities’ lives. It is also a set of institutions with a 
persistent presence across a wide range of human societies. It is also a varied set of doctrines 
and ideas which fundamentally condition how Protestants understand the world and 
themselves, even if the doctrines they believe are rarely quite the same as the doctrines their 
churches teach. But before it is any of these things, and underpinning them all, it is that old 
love-affair: a direct encounter with God’s power, whether as a lived experience, a memory or 
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a hope. That is not what it is for every Protestant, of course, but without that underpinning, 
the identities, cultures, institutions and doctrines would all collapse. That heartbeat, however 
muffled, is beneath it all. It is through that promise to change lives that Protestantism has 
changed the world. 
